Due to the extremely hazardous nature of its activities, chemical industries are always associated with the risk of harmful accidents. In the Iranian legal system, the primary principle of civil liability is based on fault, but the effectiveness of this rule in compensating for damages resulting from high-risk industrial activities is seriously questionable. The present study aims to investigate the function of the rule of strict liability in accidents at Iranian methanol production units, using a descriptive-analytical method and utilizing the economic and jurisprudential foundations of civil liability. The findings of the study show that although Iranian law provides for scattered cases of strict liability, the lack of a coherent legal regime for the chemical industry has led to inefficiency in compensation and failure to internalize the social costs of accidents. The economic analysis of the strict liability rule shows that in unilateral industrial accidents, this rule is more effective in creating incentives for safety than fault-based liability. Finally, the research concludes that, given the hazardous nature of methanol production and the existing legislative gaps, the transition to strict liability backed by mandatory insurance is an essential solution to achieve compensatory justice and economic deterrence.