Given the unprecedented increase in the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool, the tension between the legitimacy of these measures and the requirements of international trade law (including freedom of trade and contractual security) has become one of the most challenging legal issues of contemporary times. This article examines the role of independent international institutions, including the International Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and international trade arbitration institutions, in shaping the effectiveness of sanctions. The aim of the research is to analyze the function of these institutions in creating a balance between the political will of states and legal obligations. The main question is how the aforementioned institutions affect the increase or decrease in the effectiveness of sanctions. This research was conducted using a descriptive-analytical method and using case law and opinions of international institutions. The findings show that these institutions contribute to the long-term effectiveness of sanctions by playing three key roles: norm-setting (through the interpretation of security exceptions), guaranteeing fundamental rights (such as the right to a defense in listing individuals), and providing dispute resolution frameworks. The conclusion is that although independent institutions may limit the implementation of sanctions in the short term, they contribute to the stability and predictability of sanctions regimes in the international trade law system by legitimizing and establishing transparent procedures.