Severe inflation, as one of the destructive economic phenomena, has a profound impact on contractual relations and can seriously disrupt the economic equilibrium of contracts. A sudden and continuous increase in the general price level leads to a decrease in the real value of monetary obligations, an unpredictable increase in costs, and difficulty in the performance of contractual obligations, so that in many cases, the performance of the contract is associated with hardship or significant loss for one of the parties. In such circumstances, absolute adherence to the principle of the necessity of contracts conflicts with considerations of contractual justice and good faith, and the discussion of the possibility of contract amendments becomes particularly important. The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of severe inflation on contractual equilibrium and to analyze the legal bases for the possibility of contract amendments in Iranian law, considering the principles governing contracts. In this regard, an attempt is made to explain the position of institutions such as the rule of no harm, hardship, good faith, and the theory of changed circumstances in justifying contract amendments. The main question is whether severe inflation can, as a factor disrupting contractual equilibrium, provide the necessary legal basis for contract amendments in Iranian law. The research method is descriptive-analytical, and data have been collected and analyzed through the study of library resources, laws, judicial opinions, and legal doctrine. The research findings show that although Iranian law has not explicitly provided a general rule regarding contract amendments, it is possible to accept contract amendments in severe inflation conditions through a broad interpretation of jurisprudential rules and legal principles. As a result, identifying a coherent institution for contract amendments can play an important role in realizing contractual justice and increasing legal certainty in unstable economic conditions.