The military use of forced marriage has played an important role in preserving this phenomenon up to the modern era. With the growing sensitivity of the international community toward violations of the right to marriage and the efforts of human rights institutions and states to criminalize and punish perpetrators, international and domestic courts have more actively supported victims’ rights. Among these courts, the practice of the International Criminal Court is significant because forced marriage is not listed among the crimes under its jurisdiction; however, the Court has presumed its jurisdiction to adjudicate and render judgment on this matter. The main question of this research is what difference exists between forced marriage and sexual slavery, and assuming that forced marriage can be regarded as an independent crime, on what reasoning has the Court presumed jurisdiction over this offense not written in the Rome Statute? Using a descriptive-analytical method and international judicial precedents, the authors seek a well-founded answer. The findings emphasize that forced marriage is a distinct crime from sexual slavery, the commission of which on a widespread or organized scale and with knowledge against civilians constitutes a crime against humanity, and accordingly, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction under Article 5 and subparagraph (k) of Article 7 of the Rome Statute.