Government economic policies, as a strategic tool in foreign policy, have a profound impact on the principle of contractual freedom in international private markets. This study, with an analytical-comparative approach, examines how governments, through economic diplomacy, pre-contractual negotiations, and the regulation of standard models, impose mandatory clauses such as technology transfer, production localization, and environmental obligations on private contracts, while the principle of autonomy of the parties in private international law guarantees the freedom to choose the governing law and contractual terms. Focusing on the case study of Iranian oil contracts under the Iranian oil contracts model, it is shown that state economic policies move contractual freedom away from absolute and towards guided contracts, but transnational legal constraints such as the 1958 New York Convention, the UNIDROIT Principles, and bilateral investment treaties expose excessive intervention to the risk of international liability. The results of the study suggest that the balance between economic policy and contractual freedom requires efficient dispute resolution mechanisms, legal transparency, and proactive policymaking to both secure national interests and maintain the attractiveness of private markets.