حمایت از قضات ادارات در عصر سیاسی سازی: ارزیابی استقلال قضائی و ثبات رأی در دادرسی اداری

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار گروه حقوق عمومی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

2 دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد حقوق عمومی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران (مترجم مسئول)

3 دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد حقوق عمومی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

10.22034/lc.2022.140498

چکیده

چکیده
    قضات اداری که در ادارات فدرال و ایالتی خدمت می‌کنند، برخلاف بخش‌های جداگانه‌ و مستقل از دولت و (در مقایسه با) انواع کارکنان دولت [از سایر متولیان] بیشتر بحث‌برانگیزند و البته کمتر بررسی شده‌اند. اکثر مراجعه‌کنندگان به دادگاه‌های اداری، به مستقل ‌نبودن قضات آن اعتراض کرده‌اند. براساس انتقادات آن‌ها، علت این که قضات اداری در معرض تأثیرات سیاسی قرار می‌گیرند و نمی‌توانند قضاوتی بی‌طرفانه‌ داشته باشند، عضویت این قضات در تشکیلاتی با منافعی مسلّم برای آن‌ها در پرونده‌ها و ارزیابی شدن توسط همین تشکیلات است. در ایالات متحده آمریکا، ‌‌رویکردهای متنوعی برای پرداختن به این مسئله به خدمت گرفته شده است؛ در سطح فدرال، کنگره از برخی از قضات اداری در برابر ارزیابیِ اداره، حمایت قانونی می‌کند. از طرف دیگر، بیشتر ایالات از رویکرد استقلال سازمانی بهره می‌گیرند که قضات اداری را در ادارات جداگانه‌ای قرار می‌دهد که به دادرسی اداری اختصاص یافته‌اند. این پژوهش از طریق یک نظرسنجی ملی که دویست و پنجاه قاضی اداری در آن شرکت کرده‌اند، درک آن‌ها را از استقلال قضائی و ثبات‌ رأی می‌سنجد. این بررسی نشان می‌دهد که آن دسته از قضات اداری که در ادارات مستقلی به نام هیأت‌های مرکزی خدمت می‌کنند، سطح بیشتری از استقلال قضائی را گزارش کرده‌اند. همچنین آن‌ها اطمینان بیشتری دارند که حکم شان نقض نخواهد شد. پیامدهای نظری این تحقیق برای مدیریت عمومی/دولتی و پژوهشگران حقوق اداری به‌خصوص آن‌ها که دغدغه سیاسی شدن وظایف اداری را دارند، به ‌شدت درخور توجه است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Protecting Agency Judges in an Age of Politicization: Evaluating Judicial Independence and Decisional Confidence in Administrative Adjudications

نویسندگان [English]

  • Reza Tajarlou 1
  • Mohammad Javad Shafaghi 2
  • Fatemeh Mafi 3
1 Assistant Professor, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2 MA. Student in Public Law. Faculty of Law and Political Science. University of Tehran. Tehran. Iran (Corresponding Translator)
3 MA. Student in Public Law. Faculty of Law and Political Science. University of Tehran. Tehran. Iran
چکیده [English]

Administrative judges, who serve in state and federal agencies, as opposed to a separate branch of government, are an understudied, and occasionally controversial, type of public administrator. Many who find themselves in administrative courts protest the agency judge’s lack of independence. According to critics, because agency judges are members of and often evaluated by the very agency with a vested interest in the case, they are subject to political influence and cannot possibly be an impartial arbitrator. In the United States, various approaches to addressing this concern have been employed. At the federal level, Congress grants some administrative judges statutory protections from agency evaluation. Most states have utilized an organizational independence approach by placing administrative judges in separate agencies dedicated to administrative adjudications. Via a national survey returned by 250 agency judges, this study compares perceptions of judicial independence and decisional confidence. It finds that administrative judges serving in independent agencies (known as central panels) report higher levels of judicial independence and more confidence their rulings will not be overturned. The theoretical implications are significant for public administration and administrative law scholars, especially those concerned about the

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • administrative law
  • administrative judges
  • Politicization
  • Immigration
  • Social security

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